Ssi entity что это
Know Your Sanctions Lists — Sectoral Sanctions Identifications (SSI) List
This is the eighth post in a series of twelve covering the lists that make up the U.S. Government’s Consolidated Screening List. ECScreening includes access to the Consolidated Screening List as well as other sanctions lists and crucial value-adding features such as Recurring Searches, Search History, and Country Alerts.
The Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List
The Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List (SSI List) is administered by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). It identifies persons operating in sectors of the Russian economy that are subject to sanctions under Executive Order 13662. These sectors range from finance to petrochemicals to aerospace. The SSI List is not included within the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, but the lists may overlap.
The sanctions imposed on members of the SSI list include prohibitions on specific kinds of financial transactions involving or for the benefit of those persons. As detailed in OFAC FAQs, this includes “named persons, their property, and their interests in property, which includes entities owned 50 percent or more by one or more persons identified as subject to the Directives.”
Such transactions are prohibited unless licensed by OFAC. If you have a hit on the SSI list, OFAC directives should be reviewed closely for any potentially prohibited transaction.
SSI: self-sovereign or decentralised identity explained
In short, self-sovereign identity (SSI) or decentralised identity (DID) is a method of identity that centres the control of information around the user. It safeguards privacy by removing the need to store personal information entirely on a central database and gives individuals greater control over what information they share. Unlike the existing system, it’s a user-centric and user-controlled approach to exchanging authentic and digitally signed information in a much more secure way.
CO-AUTHORED BY ROSS POWER AND ELINA YUMASHEVA
Imagine, you need to open a bank account. Instead of bringing a ton of paper documents, you can simply show your digital identity (ID) to prove your identity in a matter of seconds, and the bank accepts it.
Sounds like a dream?
Nope, self-sovereign identity (SSI) makes it possible already. To understand how to let’s delve into the concepts of identity and credentials first.
Identity and credentials
Identity literally means the quality of being identical. To what? To yourself. According to the Mirriam-Webster dictionary, identity is “the condition of being the same with something described”.
A credential, in an everyday sense, is an attestation, evidence or proof of qualification, competence or authority issued to an entity, either individual or person, by a third party with relevant authority or assumed competence to do so. This may be evidence of authority, status, rights, entitlement to privileges, or the like, usually in a written form.
Essentially credentials are a means to verify identity.
Historically we have relied on public issuing bodies to verify our identities — i.e. passports, driving licence, birth certificates, etc. These credentials go on throughout our lives, being Issued to us or requested by us at times we need them. We provide them to others regularly without ever wondering what happens to them, where they now sit, and how long they’ll be retained.
Why the current model of identity doesn’t work
Digital trust is currently predicated on constant check-ups. To prove an attribute or claim, a third party is needed to certify or verify that claim. This means that the bank you want to open a bank account with will outsource your identity verification process to a vendor. Practically, this means your data is being shared with a third party, and you have limited knowledge of how this will be used and stored. This results in potentially compromised security.
The data subject (i.e. an individual or a company), at best, has to directly pay (sometimes prohibitive) fees to acquire documents and, at worst, often have no control over their own data (as often in targeted advertising).
This identity model is fundamentally broken as it’s all built and controlled by companies rather than individuals. It is, in many ways, a paradise for threat actors, as they can target organisations’ data silos and individuals. Over time, data subjects can easily lose track of what data is being stored and by whom. Or which data has been compromised, as there is no notification of this event.
Plus, there is an argument for oversharing the information — what verifiers usually need is proof that you are who you’re claiming to be. They don’t need to know any additional details, but given the current system, they’ll get access to additional info they don’t require. The most clear-cut example of this is using a utility bill or bank statement to prove your address. These documents, especially the former, may contain huge quantities of sensitive data that is completely unnecessary to show to prove an address.
Finally, it doesn’t protect from forgery, which is becoming easier and more common. In addition, as new rules have come into play over the past year due to COVID-19 and a whole new wave of attestations has been required to travel abroad, attend events or visit loved ones, more sophisticated forgery and scams have occurred. These could include fake COVID-19 results and proof of vaccination.
Self-sovereign identity as a user-centric identity model
The problems of current identity models make an argument for digital identity. According to gov.uk, “digital identities are an easy way to help us prove who we are without the need for physical documents. They can also help us prove things about us, such as our age or our qualifications.” However, much of what has been developed within digital identity has ported existing problems with the paper-based system into the digital realm.
To combat this, a more user-centric, trustworthy, and privacy-preserving digital identity paradigm can be made possible through self-sovereign identity (SSI).
SSI is a method of identity that centres the control of information around the user. It safeguards privacy by removing the need to store personal information on a central database and giving individuals control over what information they share.
To make this work, there are at least three participants involved;
- The holder is an individual in the scenario, although it can also be an organisation/company. The holder is the entity that the information attests to (i.e. you)
- The issuer is the organisation, be it a company, certifier body, or governmental organisation that has been awarded a level of trust to provide information (i.e. a public body that issued a passport)
- The verifier is the individual, organisation, company, government, and so forth to whom the holder needs to prove the legitimacy and trustworthiness of information (i.e. a bank that you want to open a bank account with).
Unlike the existing system, it’s a user-centric and user-controlled approach to exchanging authentic data in a much more secure way. Authentic data is information that’s source can be proven.
In the above diagram, the following steps take place:
- The issuer writes a public identifier to a Verifiable Data Registry;
- The Issuer issues a Credential to the Holder, signed by their public identifier;
- The Holder can manage its credentials in a digital wallet it holds;
- The Holder presents a Credential to a Verifier’;
- The Verifier can trust this data by reading and resolving the public identifier on the Verifiable Data Registry.
According to McKinsey Global Institute research, SSI could be key to unlocking access to banking, government benefits, or other services. Research suggests it could boost economic growth by 3% in the UK in 2030.
The technical building blocks of widespread SSI adoption
Core to SSI’s success is the combination of a number of building blocks. These terms have been standardized by a W3C Working Group focused on SSIs widespread adoption:
A claim is an assertion made about a subject.
A credential is a set of one or more claims made by an issuer.
A verifiable credential is a tamper-evident credential that has authorship that can be cryptographically verified. These verifiable credentials can be used to build verifiable presentations, which can also be cryptographically verified.
A verifiable presentation is a tamper-evident presentation encoded in such a way that authorship of the data can be trusted after a process of cryptographic verification.
These Verifiable Credentials (VCs) are needed to be expressed on the web in a way that is cryptographically secure, privacy-respecting, and machine-verifiable. The Working Group further outlines guidance for how this is to be achieved through the use of decentralised identifiers (DIDs) and decentralised identifier documents (DID Docs):
A decentralized identifier is a portable URL-based identifier, also known as a DID, associated with an entity. These identifiers are most often used as trusted identifiers, written into verifiable credentials and are associated with subjects such that a verifiable credential itself can be easily ported from one repository to another without the need to reissue the credential. DIDs resolve to DID documents which provide information on the DID controllers and DID subjects. An example of a DID is: did:example:123456abcdef.
A decentralized identifier document is a document (DID Doc) that is accessible using a verifiable data registry and contains information related to a specific decentralized identifier, such as the associated repository and public key information.
This is just scratching the surface of the technical elements of SSI however offers an initial insight which we will expand on in the future.
SSI application and use cases
While self-sovereign identity (SSI) sounds like an unfamiliar concept for some, others are actively leveraging the technology to address industry-specific challenges — take the Financial Conduct Authority or the IATA Travel Pass. Overall the shift to the SSI paradigm is beginning to rally more support, and 2022 is poised to be a poignant year for global SSI adoption. In fact, Our estimates suggest that the potential of the decentralised or self-sovereign identity market totals
Arguably one of the most known within the Banking sector is Know Your Customer (KYC). SSI enables a reusable KYC concept that offers a much more seamless way of ID verification. When an ID verification is needed more often due to compliance or regulatory pressure, SSI can significantly reduce the friction for users improving a customer experience while providing a compliant service. In short, current KYC is ‘single-use’ while KYC’d SSI makes KYC ‘recyclable’.
Moving beyond traditional banking, Centralised Decentralised Finance (CeDeFi) also sees a robust application for SSI.
The travel industry probably shows one of the most relatable SSI applications enforced by the pandemic developments. In the age of COVID-19, this has been made even more complex as another layer of health certification has been added. One of the projects in this space is the Covid Credentials Initiative, which aims to develop ‘privacy-preserving verifiable credentials’ to mitigate the spread of the virus through the use of SSI.
Within the Non-fungible Tokens (NFT) space, self-sovereign identity helps to prove who created, owned and/ or currently owns NFTs across their lifecycle, as well as providing ownership of fractions.
While the list can go on, especially as various industries join the bandwagon and pick up the technology, there are a few notable examples. Decentralised storage is getting more traction as SSI can be implemented to manage participants’ data and store distributed files with decentralised access control. Decentralised identity and the technical standards involved (Verifiable Credentials and Decentralised Identifiers) can also be used for e-commerce, Corporate or organisational identity and product or package identity. Read more about SSI use cases here.
Conclusion
SSI is certainly a future-proof concept that addresses issues that are universal and applicable across industries. With more and more companies leveraging SSI, the snowball effect of adoption will increase — making widespread SSI a reality soon.
We, at cheqd, help companies leverage SSI. cheqd’s network is built on a blockchain with a dedicated token for payment, which enables new business models for verifiers, holders and issuers. In these business models, verifiable credentials are exchanged in a trusted, reusable, safer, and cheaper way — alongside a customisable fee. Find out about our solution here.
Ukraine-/Russia-related Sanctions
The sectoral sanctions imposed on specified persons operating in sectors of the Russian economy identified by the Secretary of the Treasury were done under Executive Order 13662 through Directives issued by OFAC pursuant to its delegated authorities. Directive 1, as amended on September 29, 2017 in accordance with section 223(b) of the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (CAATSA) (Pub. L. 115-44), prohibits transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in debt of specified tenors or equity if that debt or equity was or is issued on or after the relevant sanctions effective date («new debt» or «new equity») by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the persons operating in Russia’s financial sector named under Directive 1, their property, or their interests in property.
There were two prior (and now superseded) versions of Directive 1, which were issued on July 16, 2014 and September 12, 2014. The prior versions of Directive 1 prohibited the same activities, but involving debt of longer than 90 days maturity (July 16, 2014 version) and 30 days maturity (September 12, 2014 version) or equity if that debt or equity was issued on or after the date a person was determined to be subject to Directive 1.
The relevant tenors of prohibited debt under Directive 1 are noted in the table below.
Period when the debt was issued
Applicable tenor of prohibited debt
On or after July 16, 2014 and before September 12, 2014
Longer than 90 days maturity
On or after September 12, 2014 and before November 28, 2017
Longer than 30 days maturity
On or after November 28, 2017
Longer than 14 days maturity
Directive 2, as amended on September 29, 2017 in accordance with section 223(c) of CAATSA, prohibits transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new debt of specified tenors by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the persons operating in Russia’s energy sector named under Directive 2, their property, or their interests in property.
There were two prior (and now superseded) versions of Directive 2, which were issued on July 16, 2014 and September 12, 2014. The prior versions of Directive 2 prohibited the same activities, but involving debt of longer than 90 days maturity if that debt was issued on or after the date a person was determined to be subject to Directive 2.
The relevant tenors of prohibited debt under Directive 2 are noted in the table below.
Period when the debt was issued
Applicable tenor of prohibited debt
On or after July 16, 2014 and before November 28, 2017
Longer than 90 days maturity
On or after November 28, 2017
Longer than 60 days maturity
Directives 1 and 2 prohibit transactions by U.S. persons as defined in E.O. 13662, wherever they are located, and transactions within the United States. Directives 1 and 2 do not require U.S. persons to block the property or interests in property of the entities identified in the Directives, nor will persons identified in Directives 1 and 2 automatically be added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. U.S. persons should reject transactions or dealings that are prohibited by Directives 1 or 2, and to the extent required by section 501.604 of the Reporting, Procedures and Penalties Regulations (31 C.F.R. part 501), U.S. persons must report to OFAC any rejected transactions within 10 business days.
Released on November 28, 2017
371. What does OFAC interpret to be debt and equity? Are there other prohibited activities under Directives 1, 2, and 3 under Executive Order (E.O.) 13662? Can U.S. financial institutions continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the entities subject to the prohibitions of these directives?
The term debt includes bonds, loans, extensions of credit, loan guarantees, letters of credit, drafts, bankers acceptances, discount notes or bills, or commercial paper. The term equity includes stocks, share issuances, depositary receipts, or any other evidence of title or ownership.
The prohibitions of Directive 1 apply to all transactions involving new debt of specified tenors (see FAQ 370) or new equity; all financing in support of such new debt or new equity; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt or new equity. For example, for debt that is issued on or after November 28, 2017, on behalf of or for the benefit of a person subject to Directive 1, the maturity of such instrument must be 14 days or less in order for a U.S. person to transact in, to provide financing for, or to otherwise deal in such debt.
For debt that is issued on or after September 12, 2014 but before November 28, 2017, on behalf of or for the benefit of a person subject to Directive 1, the maturity of such instrument must be 30 days or less in order for a U.S. person to transact in, to provide financing for, or to otherwise deal in such debt. If the terms of the agreement do not subsequently change as described in FAQ 394, then a U.S. person may deal in such debt even after the 14-day debt limit came into effect on November 28, 2017, because such debt would not constitute “new debt” for purposes of the sanctions applicable on or after November 28, 2017.
Likewise, for debt that is issued on or after July 16, 2014 but before September 12, 2014, on behalf of or for the benefit of a person subject to Directive 1, the maturity of such instrument must be 90 days or less in order for a U.S. person to transact in, to provide financing for, or to otherwise deal in such debt. If the terms of the agreement do not subsequently change as described in FAQ 394, then a U.S. person may deal in such debt even after the revised tenors came into effect on September 12, 2014 or November 28, 2017, because such debt would not constitute “new debt” for purposes of the sanctions applicable on those dates.
The prohibitions of Directive 2 apply to all transactions involving new debt of specified tenors (see FAQ 370); all financing in support of such new debt; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt.
For example, for debt that is issued on or after November 28, 2017, on behalf of or for the benefit of a person subject to Directive 2, the maturity of such instrument must be 60 days or less in order for a U.S. person to transact in, to provide financing for, or to otherwise deal in such debt.
For debt that is issued on or after July 16, 2014 but before November 28, 2017, on behalf of or for the benefit of a person subject to Directive 2, the maturity of such instrument must be 90 days or less in order for a U.S. person to transact in, to provide financing for, or to otherwise deal in such debt. If the terms of the agreement do not subsequently change as described in FAQ 394, then a U.S. person may deal in such debt even after the 60-day debt limit comes into effect on November 28, 2017 because such debt would not constitute “new debt” for purposes of the sanctions applicable on or after November 28, 2017.
The prohibitions of Directive 3 apply to all transactions involving new debt with a maturity of longer than 30 days; all financing in support of such new debt; and any dealing in, including provision of services in support of, such new debt.
All the prohibitions of these Directives extend to rollover of existing debt, if such rollover results in the creation of new debt with a maturity of longer than the applicable tenor specified in the relevant Directive (see FAQ 394).
Transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in any debt issued by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of persons subject to Directives 1, 2, or 3, or equity issued by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of persons subject to Directive 1, is permissible if the debt or equity was issued prior to the date on which the person became subject to the relevant Directive. In addition, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in debt instruments with tenors shorter than the specified tenors, even if they are issued after the sanctions effective date, is permissible. Transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in new equity instruments of persons subject to Directives 2 and 3 is permissible. U.S. financial institutions may continue to maintain correspondent accounts and process U.S. dollar-clearing transactions for the persons subject to the Directives, so long as those activities: (i) do not involve transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in transaction types prohibited by these Directives; and (ii) are not prohibited by other sanctions authorities (see, e.g., FAQS 964 and FAQs 967 — 973).
In the case of Directive 1, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in debt with a maturity of 90 days or less (if issued on or after July 16, 2014 but prior to September 12, 2014) or 30 days or less (if issued on or after September 12, 2014 but prior to November 28, 2017) that was issued by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the persons subject to Directive 1 is not prohibited if the terms of such instruments do not change subsequently (see FAQ 394 for additional detail on what constitutes the changing of terms). Similarly, in the case of Directive 2, transacting in, providing financing for, or otherwise dealing in debt with a maturity of 90 days or less (if issued on or after July 16, 2014 but prior to November 28, 2017) that was issued by, on behalf of, or for the benefit of the persons subject to Directive 2 is not prohibited if the terms of such instruments do not change subsequently. Rollovers of such instruments must comply with the new Directive 1 and 2 maturity limits that came into effect on November 28, 2017.
Ssi entity что это
Для ИХТЦ как инжиниринговой компании вопрос санкций имеет непосредственное отношение к работе. Наши партнеры хотят знать, какие материалы и технологии запрещены к импорту в Россию, что им могут дать русские ученые и инженеры в плане импортозамещения.
Мы пытались собрать информацию для собственного понимания и ощутили, что ничего толкового и по сути на русском языке нет. Новостные порталы и информационные ресурсы пишут про эмоции, хамон и пармезан, переливая из пустого в порожнее.
В итоге нам пришлось разбираться в теме самостоятельно, работая с первоисточниками – с документами Конгресса США, Министерства финансов и юстиции (в общей сложности прочитав и проанализировав более тысячи страниц). Результатами этого титанического труда мы рады поделиться с нашими читателями. Разложили по полочкам: какие пакеты санкций были введены, в отношении кого, как понять, на какие материалы, товары, технологии действуют ограничения.
Мы не разбирались в том, насколько за выполнением санкций строго следят. Хотя мы видим, что товарооборот между США и Россией в 2017 году в денежном отношении вырос на 14,4% к 2016 году, почти сравнявшись с показателями 2014 года (одного только бурбона в 2017 году из США ввезли более 2 млн. литров на сумму почти миллиард рублей).
Напоминаем о том, что мы плодотворно и активно трудимся над тем, чтобы никакие санкции были не страшны российским компаниям, пользующимся нашими услугами.
Мы собрали в одном месте все санкционные пакеты, актуальные на данный момент для понимания того, что, кому запрещено, и по какой причине.
В марте 2014 года в связи с ситуацией на Украине и воссоединением Крыма с РФ США заморозили сотрудничество с Россией в военной, космической (авиа- и ракетостроение) и атомной сферах и ввели санкции в отношении ряда лиц и компаний. Основанием для них стали исполнительные указы президента США Барака Обамы, принятые в том же году на волне массовой истерии:
Согласно этим документам, в отношении России была введена многоуровневая система санкций. Персональные санкции (Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, далее – SDN) предусматривают визовые ограничения и блокирование собственности и счетов физических и юридических лиц, занесенных в черный список. Американским гражданам и компаниям запрещается поддерживать с ними деловые связи, торговые ограничения касаются экспорта, реэкспорта и передачи материалов и технологий и автоматически распространяются на компании, в которых одному или нескольким лицам/компаниям из санкционного списка принадлежит 50 и более процентов.
Секторальные санкции (или Sectoral Sanctions Identifications List, далее – SSI) затрагивают такие ключевые отрасли российской экономики как: финансовую, энергетическую, оборонную и горно-металлургическую. Они включают ограничения на предоставление займов и оказание инвестиционных услуг, запрет на поставки вооружения, военной техники и технологий двойного назначения, а также высокотехнологичного оборудования и технологий (в частности, для использования в проектах по разведке и добыче нефти на глубоководных морских участках, на арктическом шельфе и в сланцевых пластах).
Все ограничения распространяются также на компании, в которых фигурантам «секторального» списка принадлежит 50 и более процентов. Крымские санкции запрещают ввоз или вывоз товаров, услуг или технологий в Крым и из Крыма, а также инвестиции в этот регион гражданам США.
Всего на руках американского регулятора есть четыре так называемых «директивы».
Директива №1 касается, в первую очередь банковского сектора. По ее последней редакции, с 28 ноября 2017 года кредитным организациям РФ запрещено предоставлять финансирование на срок свыше 14 календарных дней, покупать их акции и имущество (в том числе доли в других компаниях).
Директива № 2 с последними изменениями и дополнениями, вступившими в силу 28 ноября 2017 года, запрещает предоставлять финансирование на срок свыше 60 календарных дней ряду компаний нефтегазовой отрасли и связанным с ними структурам, а также покупать их акции и имущество (в том числе доли в других компаниях).
Директива № 3 также подразумевает запрет на покупку акций и имущества компаний, на которых она распространяется, а также запрет на предоставление им финансирования на срок свыше 30 календарных дней. Директива № 3 относится к предприятиям военно-промышленного комплекса и ряду других стратегических предприятий РФ.
Директива № 4 запрещает экспортировать и реэкспортировать товары, технологии и предоставлять нефинансовые услуги ряду компаний нефтегазовой отрасли и связанным с ними структурам в рамках проектов по освоению Арктического шельфа, добыче сланцевого газа и глубоководной добычи нефти. Данная директива распространяется на все подобные проекты, реализуемые на территории России, а также на проекты вне зависимости от их локализации (в том числе международные), если они инициированы после 29 января 2018 года.
Санкции, изложенные в Директиве №4, не повлияют непосредственно на банки. Они затрагивают инвестиционные проекты в области добычи нефти, в которых данные банки или аффилированные с ними компании, участвуют или, что касается проектов, начатых после 29 января 2018 года, владеют долей 33% или больше, либо контролируют большинство голосов акционеров.
В США не могут простить избрание президентом республиканца Дональда Трампа ни себе и никому другому, кто, якобы, в этом был заинтересован. Шок от результатов голосования привел к принятию ряда следующих ограничений в адрес государственного и корпоративного сектора РФ.
29 декабря 2016 года в связи с обвинениями во вмешательстве в выборы США объявили о введении очередного пакета санкций: дополнение к Исполнительному указу № 13694 от 1 апреля 2015 года «О блокировке собственности определенных лиц, проявляющих существенную вредоносную активность в киберпространстве» (далее EO 13694 или CYBER).
Поводом стали обвинения в адрес Москвы в организации хакерских атак в ходе американских выборов. Основанием для санкций послужил Исполнительный указ № 13757 от 28 декабря 2016 года – Принятие дополнительных мер касаемо национального чрезвычайного положения в отношении существенной вредоносной активности в киберпространстве (далее EO 13757 или CYBER2).
Санкции предусматривают замораживание активов фигурантов черного списка, а также практически всех сделок с Федеральной службой безопасности (ФСБ) и Главным управлением Генерального штаба ВС РФ (ранее Главное разведывательное управление, ГРУ). 27 марта 2018 года президент США Дональд Трамп продлил действие вышеупомянутых исполнительных приказов о введении санкций за кибератаки против США на год.
Летом 2017 года президент США Дональд Трамп подписал Публичный закон № 155-44 от 2 августа 2017 года «О противодействии противникам Америки посредством санкций» (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, далее CAATSA), который закрепил ограничительные меры в отношении России, Ирана и КНДР, принятые предыдущими администрациями, и ввел дополнительные.
В российской части этого документа к требованиям наказать РФ за действия в Крыму и Донбассе добавились обвинения в нарушениях прав человека «на оккупированной территории», в поставках оружия сирийскому правительству, подрыве кибербезопасности США, коррупции и пр.
Закон усложнил процесс получения кредитов российскими предприятиями и работу оборонных и энергетических компаний, а также распространил действие санкций на физические и юридические лица третьих стран, сотрудничающие с компаниями из России или инвестирующие в проекты с российским участием более 33% (эти меры касаются проектов в любой стране мира, которые будут оформлены после 29 января 2018 года). Кроме того, закон лишил американского президента права смягчать и отменять санкции без одобрения Конгресса (ранее они вводились, корректировались и снимались указами президента).
Также существуют санкционные листы по Сирии (далее SYRIA), в них попали физические и юридические лица, которые оказывают поддержку режима Башара Асада, по Северной Корее (далее DPRK) – за поставки товаров/услуг. Отдельно стоит отметить программы санкций «Противодействия распространению оружия массового поражения» (далее NPWMD) и «Международные преступные организации» (далее TCO).
Всего получается более дюжины санкционных пакетов, ограничивающих сотрудничество американского бизнеса с предприятиями из России. Судя по свежим сообщениям из-за океана, это еще далеко не предел.